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I. Introduction 
 
The International Monetary Fund has undergone various changes in the past decades. One 
notable change has been its increased use of conditionality, the practice whereby the Fund 
attaches conditions to loans it makes available to member countries in financial distress. During 
the 1990s the Fund has dramatically increased both the number of conditions and the degree to 
which these conditions are related to the internal affairs of member countries. The increased use 
of conditionality has attracted a great deal of criticism in recent years. In particular, it has been 
argued that conditions infringe on the sovereignty of countries, that the Fund is exceeding its 
jurisdiction, and that conditions have not been effective in inducing economic reform.  
In this paper I attempt to deal with these criticisms by proposing a new mechanism for 
designing conditions in loan agreements, and by arguing for the legalization and formalization of 
the procedure for IMF lending in the light of concepts and ideas derived mainly from domestic 
administrative laws.1  
The gist of the proposal is that, rather than have the Fund determine the conditions in loan 
agreements following informal negotiations with member countries, member countries will 
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Law & Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming), available at 
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Working Paper 2004/1 (Global Administrative Law Series), at 
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design the conditions themselves. Thus member countries will effectively choose to impose 
conditions on themselves. The Fund will have the power to review these conditions pursuant to 
specified grounds of review. If the conditions withstand these grounds of review, the Fund will 
have to extend the loan on the conditions designed by the member country. If the conditions do 
not withstand these grounds of review, the Fund will step in and propose its own conditions as 
under the current system.  
Section II of this paper deals with the criticisms of conditionality. I will show that there are 
no easy solutions to the problems that conditionality raises. The main conclusion of this section 
is that a balance has to be struck between the interests of the Fund and the interests of member 
countries. In Section III, I set out the proposal for self-imposed conditionality, describing the 
main features of the proposal and its main advantages in the light of the criticisms discussed in 
Section II. I also discuss the content of the grounds of review and the application procedure. 
Section IV deals in detail with potential problems that the proposal entails and possible solutions 
to these problems. Finally, in Section V I will discuss the consequences of legalization and 
formalization of conditionality and the implications that the proposal may have for the role of the 
Fund.  
It should be noted that this paper does not deal with many questions that concern the Fund’s 
activity, such as, whether it makes sense to unify the Fund and the World Bank, whether it makes 
sense to maintain the Fund at all given its current function as lender of last resort,2 or the moral 
hazard problem.3 It also does not deal directly with more specific criticisms regarding the 
composition of the Fund’s staff and the alleged control of the major shareholders over Fund 
                                                 
2 Stanley Fischer, ‘On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort’, in Stanley Fischer, IMF Essays from a 
Time of Crisis (The MIT Press, 2004), 7. 
3 For a discussion of the moral hazard problem, see Martin Feldstein, ‘Refocusing the IMF’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
77, No. 2 (March/April 1998), 20; Stanley Fischer, ‘The IMF and the Asian Crisis’, in Stanley Fischer, IMF Essays 
from a Time of Crisis (The MIT Press, 2004), 67, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/032098.HTM (last visited 10 October 2004); Fischer, Ibid.  
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resources.4 I do not challenge the Fund’s role as a lender of last resort to countries in financial 
distress, which are exclusively developing countries in practice.5  
 
II. Increasing Criticism of IMF Conditionality  
 
The manner in which the Fund has formulated conditions in loan agreements and the substance 
of those conditions has been subject to fierce criticism. Recent financial crises, especially the 
Southeast Asia Crisis and the crises in Russia and Argentina, have led the Fund to impose 
stringent and expansive conditions in loan agreements, extending far beyond the traditional 
ambit of the Fund’s powers. Conditions have increased both in number and in the degree of 
intervention in the internal affairs of member countries.6 They have come not only to include 
general macroeconomic factors, but to involve direct interference in issues, such as, for example, 
tax rates, banking regulation and even prices of commodities. There has been a shift from pure 
macroeconomic factors to microeconomic structural reforms. As pointed out by Lowenfeld, 
‘…the boundary between international and internal concern seems to have largely disappeared.’7 
It is important to discuss the main criticisms of conditionality, as they set the background for my 
proposal.  
                                                 
4 See Ngaire Woods, ‘The United States and the International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence within the 
World Bank and the IMF’, in Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno (eds), US Hegemony 
and International Organizations (Oxford University Press, 2003), 92.  
5 There is no guarantee that developed countries will not be in need of the Fund’s resources. Before 1977 the UK, 
France and Italy were among the countries that had to apply for loans to the Fund. Although developed countries 
have not applied to the Fund since then, recent discussion regarding the enormous trade deficit of the United States, 
currently amounting to approximately $550 billion, suggests that the role of the Fund may well change in new, albeit 
unexpected, circumstances.  
6 Carlos Santiso, ‘Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality’, Geo. Pub. Pol’y 
Rev. Vol. 7 (2001), 1, at 10. As Santiso points out, ‘…from 1989 to 1999, the share of programs with structural 
conditions increased from 60 percent to 100 percent and the average number of structural conditions per program 
increased from three to 12.’ See also Ariel Buira, ‘An Analysis of IMF Conditionality’, in Ariel Buira (ed), 
Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: Developing Country Perspectives (Anthem, 2003), 55, at 62. Buira notes 
that at the highest level, programs with Korea included 94 structural conditions, with Thailand 73, and with 
Indonesia 140 structural undertakings; for more detailed analysis, see Morris Goldstein, ‘IMF Structural 
Conditionality: How Much Is Too Much?’, Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 01-04 (2002), 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=300885 (last visited 10 January 2005), at 31-44.  
7 Andreas Lowenfeld, ‘The International Monetary System and the Erosion of Sovereignty: Essay in Honor of 
Cynthia Lichtenstein’, Boston Col. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. (2002), 257, at 269.  
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A. Excess of Jurisdiction 
 
It is argued that the Fund has exceeded its jurisdiction, as conferred on it by the Articles of 
Agreement. Critics of the Fund argue that the Fund does not have the power to require countries 
to undergo substantial internal reform that may involve significant cultural and infrastructural 
changes which lie beyond the ambit of the Fund’s authority, and that the Fund’s conditions 
should essentially be limited to macroeconomic measures.8 On the other hand, others have tried 
to defend a broader interpretation of the Fund’s jurisdiction. For example, Hockett seems to 
argue that the words of the Articles of the Agreement give the Fund the scope to impose any 
conditions it considers appropriate,9 and that member countries can simply refrain from 
borrowing if they disagree with these conditions.10  
Although this argument may be defensible on the basis of the wording of the Articles, 
Hockett downplays the public character of the Fund and its duties toward the international 
community. The Fund is not, as Hockett suggests, like any other creditor concerned with 
repayment of its debt. The Fund is a public institution that has a duty to serve certain specified 
public purposes,11 the underlying rationale of these purposes being the maintenance and 
enhancement of international financial stability. Most importantly, the Fund has ‘To give 
confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to 
them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments 
in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or 
                                                 
8 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Penguin, 2002); Mary C. Tsai, ‘Globalization and 
Conditionality: Two Sides of the Sovereignty Coin’, Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus., Vol. 31 (2000), 1317.  
9  Article V, Section 3(a) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (the ‘Articles of 
Agreement’), done at Bretton Woods, 22 July 1944, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 60 Stat. 1401, as amended, 31 May 1968, 30 
April 1976, June 28 1990, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/: ‘The Fund shall adopt policies on 
the use of its general resources, including policies for special balance of payments problems, that will assist 
members to solve their balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, 
and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund.’ 
10 Robert Hockett, ‘From Macro to Micro to “Mission-Creep”: Defending the IMF’s Emerging Concern with the 
Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global Financial Stability’, Colum. J. Transnat’l L., Vol. 41 (2002), 153, at 178-180, 
184-189.  It is worth pointing out that Hockett concedes that the conditions that the Fund imposes may be unwise. 
Thus Hockett defends the legal authority to make the conditions rather than the substance of the conditions.  
11 Article I of the Articles of Agreement.  
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international prosperity.’12 Therefore, when the Fund exercises its powers it has a duty to act 
within the proper scope of its authority as defined by the Articles of Agreement. Although loan 
conditions are not subject to any process of judicial review, their legitimate scope should not be 
defined solely on the basis of the Fund’s subjective judgment.  
The problem is how to interpret the scope of the Fund’s jurisdiction, given its public 
purposes and the need to safeguard its interests. As pointed out by Lowenfeld, it is not clear how 
and where to draw the jurisdictional line in each case between matters which the Fund is entitled 
to take into consideration and matters which the Fund should refrain from dealing with.13 For this 
purpose, the distinction between macroeconomic and microeconomic structural conditions has 
been shown to be unhelpful.14 One suggestion has been to frame the jurisdictional line in simple 
terms, asking whether a proposed condition is truly necessary to restore the borrower country to 
capital markets and enable it to repay its debts.15 But leading economists may diverge on the 
question of what measures are actually necessary, and especially whether microeconomic 
measures are required.16 In some instances, simple measures are sufficient, and in other 
instances, more extensive and intrusive measures are necessary. Again, economists will diverge 
on these issues and only ex post analysis of economic developments following the loan can 
provide clearer answers.17 
                                                 
12 Article I(v) of the Articles of Agreement. 
13 Lowenfeld, above footnote 7, at 269-271.   
14 See Goldstein, above footnote 6, at 22-31. In particular, Goldstein shows that conditions requiring microeconomic 
measures may be necessary even if the mandate of the Fund is defined narrowly to include only assisting a country 
to get out of a current crisis rather than minimizing the chances of getting into future crises or inducing economic 
growth.   
15 Feldstein, above footnote 3, at 27. 
16 Lowenfeld, above footnote 7, at 269-271, cites the debate between two prominent economists. On the one hand, 
Feldstein argues that the Fund should require reform only when it is needed to restore the country’s access to 
international capital markets, and only if it concerns a technical matter that does not interfere unnecessarily with the 
proper jurisdiction of a sovereign government. Feldstein argues that the conditions imposed by the Fund do not 
withstand this test. Stanley Fischer, the then Deputy Managing Director of the Fund, on the other hand, replies that 
the wide reforms in the Asian Crisis were indeed necessary and that certain issues, such as banking sector reform, 
are highly technical, far more than the size of the budget deficit. See Feldstein, above footnote 3; Fischer, above 
footnote 3. 
17 Nonetheless, it is important to note that in many cases the conditions were clearly not strictly necessary to enable 
the borrower country to recover from financial distress. Goldstein, above footnote 6, at 86, points out that the Fund 
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B. Infringement of Sovereignty 
 
A second interrelated argument concerns the sovereignty of member countries. Critics of the 
Fund have argued that conditions in Fund loans infringe on the sovereignty of member 
countries.18 As mentioned above, conditions have included, inter alia, detailed reform in various 
fields, including corporate governance, banking regulation, tax reform, liberalization of trade, 
eliminating ceilings on foreign investments, permitting foreign banks and companies to establish 
subsidiaries and price controls, etc. These are all matters that are normally decided by the 
government in each country. Article 1 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
expressly says: ‘Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic 
system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its 
people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.’19  
Conditionality is said to infringe on sovereignty because it constrains the power of sovereign 
governments to determine national policies. Feldstein, for example, says: ‘The legitimate 
political institutions of the country should determine the nation’s economic structure and the 
nature of its institutions. A nation’s desperate need for short term financial help does not give the 
IMF the moral right to substitute its technical judgments for the outcomes of the nation’s 
political process.’20 Similarly, Tsai says that conditionality handicaps the debtor nations’ ability 
to develop their own solutions to economic disasters, and that they are forced to abandon the 
course of economic development chosen prior to the crisis and to accept the vision for economic 
development chosen by the IMF. The economic changes that are imposed are not temporary and 
                                                                                                                                                             
staff itself regarded only 30-40 percent of all structural reforms included in Fund programs as critical to achieving 
the program’s macroeconomic objectives. This indicates that structural conditionality has become excessive.  
18 I use the term sovereignty loosely to mean the traditional authority of governments to determine domestic 
policies. For an analysis of the changing meaning of the concept of sovereignty, see John H. Jackson, ‘Sovereignty-
Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’, Am. J. Int’l L., Vol. 97 (2003), 782;  Kal Raustiala, 
‘Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law’, JIEL, Vol. 6, No. 4, (2003), 841.  
19 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, 2315th 
plen. mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).  
20 Feldstein, above footnote 3, at 27.   
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are meant to last after the financial crisis has elapsed, in circumstances where there may be other, 
alternative regulatory and economic choices.21 Although a country may well choose not to 
borrow money from the Fund and thereby exercise its sovereignty,22 in many cases, where the 
costs of not accepting conditionality are very high – especially the costs of default – there is no 
real choice and countries may be compelled to accept the dictates of the Fund.23  
On the other hand, conditionality has important legitimate purposes. As Hockett correctly 
argues, ‘…it seems doubtful that the Fund could legitimately lend to troubled members without 
imposing conditions reasonably calculated to ensuring monetary stabilization within their 
jurisdictions…Irresponsible lending, “throwing good money after bad”, would be illegitimate 
behavior on the part of the [Fund]…whose members supply the borrowed funds. Conditional 
lending, therefore, is not only legitimate, but is affirmatively required.’24 Thus, although 
conditions may infringe on some aspects of a country’s sovereignty, it is clear that responsible 
lending requires the Fund to impose conditions when it lends money to countries in financial 
crisis. Even some of the Fund’s most prominent critics argue that sometimes it does not intervene 
enough. Stiglitz argues that the Fund should have required some countries to undergo land 
reform.25 Likewise, Feldstein argues that the Fund should have required Argentina to undergo 
significant tax reform. 26 In some instances, too much deference to domestic policies has 
aggravated a country’s financial situation.27  
In essence, the conditions are designed through a process of informal negotiations between 
the Fund and the country. The Fund offers financial support in exchange for the government’s 
                                                 
21 Tsai, above footnote 8, at 1326.  
22 For example, Malaysia chose to not follow the Fund’s prescriptions during the East Asia Crisis and pursued its 
own recovery policy. Malaysia managed to recover from the financial crisis despite, and some argue because, it did 
not follow the Fund’s recovery plan. See Stiglitz, above footnote 8, at 122-125; Tsai, above footnote 8, at 1328.  
23 See Buira, above footnote 6, at 60.  
24 Hockett, above footnote 10, at 186-187 [my emphasis]. 
25 Stiglitz, above footnote 8, at 80-82. 
26 Feldstein, above footnote 3, at 218-219.  
27 A good example is the Fund’s support for Argentina’s unsustainable policy of fixed exchange rates. See 
Independent Evaluation Office, IMF, ‘The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001’ (2004) (hereinafter referred to as IEO 
(2004)). All reports of the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF are available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/pap.asp.  
  10
commitment to make certain changes to its policies. The problem is that countries, especially 
small ones, may have very little leverage vis-à-vis the Fund in crisis situations, and they can 
therefore be compelled to accept the Fund’s dictates. Recent reports of the Independent 
Evaluation Office of the IMF (the ‘IEO’) confirm that although in some instances conditions 
reflected national choices, the Fund did use its leverage to pursue long term policies that were 
not critical to crisis resolution.28 Buira persuasively argues that the political strength of each 
country has been a major factor in determining the extent to which the Fund is able to pressure 
countries to accept its policies, and moreover, that conditions have too often reflected the 
political interests of donor countries.29  
The Fund is not unaware of the above criticisms. The most recent Guidelines on 
Conditionality strongly emphasize the importance of countries’ ownership of their economic and 
financial policies. The Guidelines expressly state that ‘ …the Fund will be guided by the 
principle that the member has primary responsibility for the selection, design, and 
implementation of its economic and financial policies.’30 Moreover, the Guidelines emphasize 
that conditions must be critical to achieve the goals of Fund programs and should be limited to 
the minimum necessary for this purpose.  
Although some progress has been made, it is questionable whether these guidelines 
materially change the balance of power between the Fund and member countries.31 Given that 
                                                 
28 See Independent Evaluation Office, IMF, ‘Evaluation of Prolonged Use of IMF Resources’ (2002) (hereinafter 
referred to as IEO (2002)); Independent Evaluation Office, IMF, ‘The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: 
Indonesia, Korea, Brazil’ (2003) (hereinafter referred to as IEO (2003a)). Countries that suffered from weak 
ownership of conditionality include Pakistan, the Philippines and Indonesia. IEO (2003a) seems to endorse 
Feldstein’s criticism and expressly states at 43:‘The crisis should not be used as an opportunity to seek a long 
agenda of reforms just because leverage is high, irrespective of how justifiable they may be on the merits. This 
should be the approach even if reformist groups within the government are keen to use the leverage of the program 
to push reforms.’ 
29 Buira, above footnote 6.  
30 Section A(3) of the Guidelines on Conditionality, IMF, 25 September 2002, at 
http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf (last visited 11 October 2004) [my emphasis]. 
31 See Tony Killick, Overseas Development Institute, The ‘Streamlining’ of IMF Conditionality’: Aspirations, 
Reality and Repercussions (April 2002), at http://www.odi.org.uk/iedg/Projects/imf_conditionality.pdf (last visited 
25 January 2005). Killick points out that since the formulation of the new Guidelines on Conditionality, the number 
of conditions in Fund loans has been reduced by approximately one quarter and conditions tend to focus more on the 
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the negotiation process remains essentially informal and confidential, there are no effective 
institutional means for ensuring that the Fund will follow its own guidelines and that its 
intervention is, so far as possible, consistent with the political, social and economic aspirations of 
member countries.32 The test for the ‘criticality’ of conditions under the new Guidelines remains 
the product of an unreviewable, informal and confidential process and therefore does not provide 
an adequate safeguard for countries’ sovereignty and ownership of policy.  
 
C. One-Size-Fits-All: Should the Fund Pursue Economic and Legal 
Convergence?  
 
The Fund has been accused of applying the same prescriptions to every country, whatever the 
problems encountered may be and irrespective of its social, economic and political 
characteristics. Stiglitz, for example, has accused the Fund of imposing its ‘economic ideology’ 
of ‘market fundamentalism’ on developing countries.33 While Stiglitz’s accusation is very 
debatable,34 there are strong indications that conditionality has suffered from a bias towards 
particular policies.  
For example, Feldstein argues that the Fund applied virtually identical prescriptions to 
Russia, Korea and Thailand, even though these countries were undergoing essentially different 
crises.35 Russia was a country emerging from a communist regime that needed structural 
adjustments to a capitalist economy, whereas Thailand suffered from a large account deficit, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Fund’s core areas of expertise. But, in many loans the number of conditions remains very high and the evidence on 
the level of country ownership is inconsistent. In addition, it seems that conditions dropped from Fund loans are 
being taken up in the World Bank programs. See also Eurodad, Streamlining of Structural Conditionality – What 
Has Happened? (May 2003), at http://eurodad.org/uploadstore/cms/docs/Streamliningfinal.pdf (last visited 23 
January 2005); Angela Wood, World Vision International, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Ownership, PRSPs 
and IFI Conditionality (2004), at http://www.global-
poverty.org/PolicyAdvocacy/pahome2.5.nsf/gereports/00D3C4F30C7E423E88256E7F000CB054/$file/One%20Ste
p%20Forward.pdf (last visited 23 January 2005). A major critique in these reports is that the Fund does not seriously 
consider the policy alternatives proposed by developing countries.  
32 It is noteworthy that the old Guidelines on Conditionality drafted in 1979 were not materially different from the 
recent version and required that conditionality be largely limited to macroeconomic variables. These guidelines were 
practically ignored by the Fund in the 1990s. See Buira, above note 6, at 67-68.  
33 Stiglitz, above footnote 8.  
34 For counter views see Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford University Press, 2004), at 256-261; 
Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (Yale University Press, 2004), at 288-295.  
35 Feldstein, above footnote 3.   
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Korea was undergoing temporary illiquidity. Nonetheless, they all had to follow similar 
prescriptions, including: privatization, trade and capital market liberalization, conditions 
facilitating foreign direct investment, corporate laws facilitating hostile takeovers, conditions 
requiring more central bank independence and general austerity measures, such as higher tax 
rates, less government spending and higher interest rates. Likewise, a recent IEO report suggests 
that Fund policies are sometimes tainted by contractionary bias and tend to overestimate the 
beneficial effects of austerity measures.36  
Apart from concerns regarding the appropriateness of the Fund’s measures, these standard 
prescriptions raise the question of the extent to which countries share, or should share, a unified 
understanding of good economic policy-making and regulatory approaches. Although there may 
be benefits to a convergence of understandings,37 we have yet to reach such a state of affairs, 
even if we consider exclusively countries with western, capitalist and democratic backgrounds. 
First, despite unanimity as to certain basic principles, economists diverge substantially as to the 
required measures for economic recovery. One clear example concerns inflation rates. Whereas 
some economists consider the reduction of inflation as a necessary step towards economic 
recovery, others maintain that a temporarily high inflation rate may be conducive to recovery 
because it encourages growth and prevents unemployment. Similar disagreements pertain to 
other measures, such as the reduction of budget deficit and government spending, foreign direct 
investment, and trade and capital market liberalization. Although all economists agree that these 
are generally desirable measures, there is ample disagreement with regard to issues such as 
timing, sequencing, prioritizing, and the degree to which these measures should be pursued.  
                                                 
36Independent Evaluation Office, IMF, ‘Fiscal Adjustment in IMF-Supported Program’ (2003)) (hereinafter referred 
to as IEO (2003b)), at 6-7. This report concludes, however, that the charge that the Fund applies a one-size-fits-all 
approach to fiscal measures in its loan programs is not founded. In addition, Kenneth Rogoff, a former Chief 
Economist of the IMF, argues that the Fund puts excessive pressure on countries to reduce their inflation rates. See 
Kenneth Rogoff, ‘The Sisters at 60’ The Economist, 22 July 2004.  
37 For example, reducing transaction costs.  
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Second, even within the prosperous economies there are significant divergences in approach 
towards issues such as privatization, corporate governance, banking regulation, etc. For example, 
the role of government in promoting social welfare in some countries, such as Sweden, is 
substantially larger than in other Western countries, such as the United States. The level of 
independence of central banks in different countries varies, and their goals may be defined 
differently.38 In some countries corporate laws facilitate hostile takeovers while in other 
countries they are generally discouraged. Whether Anglo-American models – however 
efficiently they may work in some countries – are suitable for developing countries is an issue far 
from being resolved,39 and the relevance of culture and path dependence to designing efficient 
solutions has not been fully explored. Therefore, it does not make sense to allow the Fund to 
impose its own views, when there are other legitimate alternative forms of regulatory framework.  
Several observations can be made at this stage. First, there are some elementary economic 
‘truths’ upon which all nations seem to agree. For example, all agree that long-term high 
inflation is inefficient. Second, for many economic and regulatory issues, there is a range of 
legitimate and reasonable structures. For example, a country may temporarily limit foreign direct 
investment because domestic actors need to be strengthened before they can sustain competition 
with foreign actors; the government can decide to maintain some short-term inflation to prevent 
excessive unemployment; corporate laws may require mandatory tender offers in takeover 
situations, etc.   
Accordingly, when conditions are being designed, there may be several options that fall 
within the range of reasonable economic policies. All of these reasonable policies are in principle 
ex ante adequate to meet the Fund’s broad objectives of ensuring that the borrower country 
                                                 
38 For example, legislation can limit the discretion of the central bank to achieving price stability, but it may also 
allow central banks to take into account employment and social issues in exercising monetary policies. In fact, the 
mandate of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan and (at least formally) the European Central Bank is not limited 
to price stability.  
39 For a critique of applying the Anglo-American corporate governance model to developing countries, see Ajit 
Singh, ‘Corporate Governance, the Big Business-Groups and the G-7 Reform Agenda: A Critical Analysis’, Seoul 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2002), 103.  
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repays its debt, maintaining stability in international capital markets, and helping the country 
return to capital markets. But within this range of reasonableness, countries should be left to 
make their choice of policy in accordance with their own cultural, political and economic 
aspirations.  
It is possible, in theory, that with an already growing convergence of economic factors and 
economic standards, the range of reasonableness in economic policy-making will become 
narrower to the extent that there will be only one economic solution to each problem. But such 
convergence must be reached through a process of deliberation, experimentation and 
participation of all stakeholders in the process – not through conditions imposed in loans to 
countries in financial crisis.  
 
D. The IMF’s Prescriptions Have Been Ineffective  
 
In many instances, the Fund’s prescriptions have been ineffective in restoring confidence and 
financial stability. One of the main consequences of the ineffectiveness of conditions is that 
countries have repeatedly failed to recover from ongoing financial distress and continue to seek 
Fund assistance over a prolonged period. Although this failure is attributable in large part to the 
countries’ policies and external economic conditions, there is nevertheless considerable evidence 
of misguided policies in the Fund’s prescriptions. The IEO reports criticize the Fund for several 
failures, including: failure to address vulnerabilities in countries’ economies; failure to take into 
account the political feasibility of Fund programs and implementation capacity constraints; over-
optimistic assessments of the effects of conditionality; inadequate prioritization; insufficient 
focus on key structural issues, leading to confusion in implementation and distraction from 
critical reforms; and insufficient attention to social concerns and the need for adequate safety 
nets.40  
                                                 
40 See IEO (2002), above footnote 28; IEO (2003a), above footnote 28; IEO (2003b), above footnote 36.   
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In some instances, it appears that conditions actually aggravated the financial situation. 
Conditions requiring member countries to privatize state-owned enterprises before they had 
effective competition laws led to the creation of predatory private monopolies.41 Similarly, in 
some societies the lack of safety nets to assist domestic workers who might lose their jobs 
following privatization or policies of cutting-off food subsidies were a source of acute social and 
political unrest.42 Moreover, trade liberalization and foreign direct investment, albeit beneficial 
in principle, may cause severe unemployment when prematurely imposed on developing 
countries.43  
Concerns have been raised about the Fund’s insufficient expertise in two main respects. First, 
the Fund is somewhat limited in its capacity to understand the complex social and political 
circumstances of member countries.44 Domestic experts with lifelong familiarity with local 
politics, conditions and trends may be better informed than the Fund’s staff in this respect.45 
Second, structural conditionality has focused on several areas which lie significantly beyond the 
Fund’s main expertise in monetary and fiscal issues. For example, between 1996 and 1999 about 
two-thirds of the structural policy conditions involved financial-sector policies, tax and 
expenditure reforms, public enterprises and privatizations.46  
But again the problem is more complicated. First, some of the Fund’s prescriptions have been 
very successful and, when adequately followed, yielded desirable results. For example, the 
austerity package which Mexico committed to implement in 1995 has proved extremely 
successful, and Mexico was able to pay its debt to the Fund even before it became due.47 Second, 
in many instances the Fund may be better placed than domestic governments to pinpoint 
inefficiencies in the domestic economy, partly because of its professionalism and expertise, and 
                                                 
41 Stiglitz, above footnote 8, at 57; Goldstein, above footnote 6, at 55.  
42 Stiglitz, above footnote 8, at 57,119-120.  
43 Ibid., at 59-73.  
44 IOE (2003b), above footnote 36, at 9,59.  
45 Stiglitz, above footnote 8, at 41.  
46 Goldstein, above footnote 6, at 35.  
47 Andreas Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 590. 
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partly because in many cases a third-party observer may be a better judge and critic of a stagnant 
and inefficient system. It must be remembered that not infrequently domestic governments 
significantly contribute to, or even precipitate, a financial crisis.  
 
E. Conditionality is a Poor Incentive for Economic Reform  
 
Many studies have concluded that conditionality in loan agreements is a poor incentive for 
inducing economic reform. Conditionality fails to create an incentive system sufficient to induce 
governments to implement policies they would not otherwise undertake, or would undertake 
more gradually.48 The IEO has consistently stressed the importance of ownership to effective 
implementation and economic recovery.49 Thus, the best results have been achieved in 
circumstances where the member country was committed to implementing Fund policies. For 
example, Korea implemented a set of far-reaching structural reforms50 largely because these 
reforms enjoyed strong political commitment. The worse results have been obtained in countries, 
as Indonesia, where program ownership was weak.51 A country which resists a specific reform is 
unlikely to implement it effectively and promptly.52 More strikingly, a recent report of the IEO 
expressly states: 
When action in areas that are not macro-critical is nevertheless deemed to be important, a 
“second-best” policy package that is strongly owned may be more likely to help restore 
                                                 
48 Tony Killick, Ramani Gunalatika & Ana Marr, Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change (London 
Routledge: 1998), at 163-165. 
49 See IEO (2002), above footnote 28; IEO (2003a), above footnote 28. Ownership is difficult to define and even 
more difficult to identify. IEO (2003a) says that assessments of ownership require a careful understanding of 
political economy issues. In the context of Indonesia, the symbolic signature of the President on the Letter of Intent, 
intended to signal true ownership, proved to be misleading. Ownership implies not only the support of senior 
government officials, the central bank and finance ministry, but also the support of parliament, the bureaucracy, 
stakeholders and civil society – that is sufficient (although not complete) to implement the relevant policies.  
50 The reforms in Korea included: regulation of merchant banks, adopting internationally accepted accounting 
standards, removing restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic corporations, allowing foreign banks to open 
subsidiaries, and several corporate governance reforms. 
51 See IEO (2003a), above footnote 28; Statement by Montek S. Ahluwalia, Director, Independent Evaluation Office 
of the International Monetary Fund at the General Assembly of the Club de Madrid, IMF Operations and 
Democratic Governance: Some Issues (2003), at  http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2003/sp/110103.htm  (last 
visited 20 December 2004).  
52 Santiso, above footnote 6, at 9, cites a study conducted by Miles Kahler showing a positive association between 
government commitment to reform and program implementation in relation to conditions imposed by the World 
Bank. In 9 out of 16 programs with high implementation levels, prior government commitment was strong. In 8 out 
of 11 poorly executed programs, government commitment was low.  
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confidence than a “first-best” package that is painfully negotiated and over which there are 
substantial domestic reservations.53  
In addition, there is strong evidence that the rates of compliance with conditions have fallen 
sharply as the Fund increased the number and breadth of loan conditions, especially those 
concerning structural reform.54 One of the main reasons for this is that the increase in the number 
of non-critical structural conditions has distracted attention and focus from those which are vital 
to economic recovery. Moreover, the more structural conditions there are, and the more detailed 
they are, the less likely it becomes that they will be owned by governments and enjoy domestic 
political support.  
As discussed above, the recent Guidelines on Conditionality are designed to address some of 
these problems; but again, they seem to have brought only modest changes, and there is no 
institutional means to monitor and review their application.  
 
F. Lack of Accountability and Transparency 
 
The increase in the effect of conditionality on the economies and political structure of developing 
countries calls for greater accountability of the Fund to its stakeholders and the public at large, 
and for better transparency of its decision-making processes. As Stewart says, as the intensity of 
regulatory authority by international regime continues to grow, there is a need for an effective 
legal institutional mechanism of accountability and transparency.55 Several problems with 
conditionality are particularly pertinent.  
First, the Fund is insufficiently accountable to developing countries. The day-to-day work of 
the Fund is overseen by its Executive Board. However, developing countries have no effective 
                                                 
53 IEO (2003a), above footnote 28, at 43.   
54 Buira, above footnote 6, at 65, points out that ‘…with the increase in structural conditionality observed in the 
1990s, the rate of compliance declined markedly after 1988, and dramatically in 1993-7, when only 27.6 per cent of 
141 arrangements could be considered in compliance.’ Compliance is defined here as disbursement of 75 percent or 
more of the total loan. See also Goldstein, above footnote 6, at 45-48. 
55 Stewart, above footnote 1.  
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representation on the Board and it is dominated by the major shareholders.56 Moreover, the 
Fund’s staff exerts substantial control over the Fund’s policies and the Board’s supervision is 
weak.57 The major shareholders have substantial influence over the staff’s decision-making via 
informal avenues, and decisions have often been taken without consulting the Executive Board.  
Second, the review process of the Fund’s decisions is conducted by the Fund itself via 
various internal and external evaluations. The internal evaluations are confidential, but the 
external evaluations are generally published.58 Until recently, external reviews have had little 
influence and few ex post assessments were undertaken by the Fund.59 With the establishment of 
the IEO in 2002, external evaluations are expected to gain more importance, and they have 
already been helpful in improving the Fund’s operations. However, their effectiveness in 
inducing follow-up changes is limited because they are not required to be taken into account in 
the Fund’s daily operations, and because there is no institutional mechanism for supervising and 
monitoring proposed reforms. The IEO itself stresses the importance of systematic ex post 
reviews and the study of past cases for the effectiveness of Fund programs.60  
Finally, the Fund’s decision-making process suffers from a lack of transparency. Several 
defects have been identified by the IEO. There is often uncertainty regarding the reasons for 
particular decisions and the facts on which they are based. For example, a recent IEO report on 
Argentina states: ‘There was also a lack of clarity as to why a particular decision was made. The 
absence of clear rules led to excessive reliance on discretion, which in turn created an 
                                                 
56 See Ngaire Woods, ‘Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable’, International Affairs, Vol. 77 
(2001), 83; Ariel Buira, ‘The Governance of the IMF’, in Ariel Buira (ed), Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: 
Developing Country Perspectives (Anthem, 2003), 13.  
57 Woods, Ibid; See also IEO (2004), above footnote 27; IEO (2003a), above footnote 28.  
58 Ngaire Woods & Amrita Narlikar, ‘Governance and the Limits of Accountability: the WTO, the IMF and the 
World Bank’, International Social Science Journal, Vol. LIII, No. 170 (November 2001), 569, at 575.  
59 For example, IEO (2002), above footnote 28, at 12, says: ‘Relatively few systematic ex post assessments of 
programs were undertaken (and with the exception of the Philippines) there was generally limited discussion from 
prolonged program involvement.’  
60 IEO (2002), above footnote 28. IEO (2002), at 13 reads: ‘The IMF ability to learn from experience is hampered by 
(i) the relative scarcity of systematic ex post assessments of programs and (ii) the slow pace of at which lessons 
learned in the context of cross-country policy reviews – which are often insightful –permeate operational practices. 
Moreover, many of the most candid internal assessments and debates on alternative policy strategies in individual 
countries were not reflected in subsequent Board papers.’ 
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environment of great uncertainty and unpredictability as to what the IMF would do next and 
encouraged the Argentine authorities to pursue questionable measures in an attempt to gamble 
for redemption.’61 The rationale for the Fund’s decisions is not brought out in the Fund’s 
documents, and there is insufficient explanation of proposed policies and the assumptions that 
underlie them.62 There is also great uncertainty regarding the extent to which political 
considerations and interests affect the Fund’s decision-making and their interaction with 
technical judgment.63  
 
G. Intermediate Conclusion 
 
It is useful to summarize the above observations before setting out my proposal for self-imposed 
conditionality. First, it is virtually impossible to rely solely on a formal distinction to define the 
extent to which conditionality can interfere with a country’s internal affairs. Distinctions 
between microeconomic and macroeconomic criteria, or between internal or international 
criteria, are not practical for the reasons specified above. Moreover, what is necessary to solve 
economic crises is a subject of substantial disagreement.  
Second, there is at least some trade-off between conditionality and sovereignty. Countries 
that approach the Fund must recognize that they will have to cede some sovereignty and control 
over domestic policy-making in exchange for the Fund’s assistance. However, the Fund should 
not impose conditions beyond what is warranted to achieve the goals of Fund programs.   
Third, in many instances of financial crisis there may be a range of reasonable effective 
solutions to which different economists may subscribe. Member countries should be able to 
make their policy choices within this range of possible solutions. A mechanism which allows 
                                                 
61 IEO (2004), above footnote 27, at 73; IEO (2002), above footnote 28, at 12, similarly says: ‘Many programs had 
difficulty in dealing with uncertainty, in part because program documents often did not analyze the key risks to a 
program and specify how policies would broadly respond to those risks.’  
62 See IEO (2003b), above footnote 36, at 5, 11.  
63 IEO (2002), above footnote 28, at 12, 64. This report also notes that ‘…the lack of transparency can give rise to 
exaggerated perceptions of political pressures, which are likely to weaken the effectiveness of IMF-supported 
programs.’ See also Wolf, above footnote 34, at 295.  
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member countries to make these choices would enable countries to exercise maximum 
sovereignty without compromising the legitimate interests and concerns of the Fund.  
Fourth, the Fund has no comparative advantage vis-à-vis developing countries in respect of 
certain issues, especially those that require a profound understanding of the cultural, social and 
political circumstances of the country. Conditions must take account of such circumstances in 
order to maximize the chances for their full implementation and for the country’s economic 
recovery. Thus, more should be done to increase the participation of domestic experts and 
officials with relevant knowledge and information in designing Fund programs.  
Fifth, there is a need for a better incentive system to get countries to adopt and implement 
reform policies. The ‘ownership’ concept embedded in ‘soft’ guidelines is insufficient without a 
meaningful, albeit imperfect, formal mechanism to induce countries to initiate reform proposals.   
Finally, the development of conditionality, in particular its increasing effect and seemingly 
decreasing effectiveness, poses a challenge to the legitimacy of the Fund. There is a pressing 
need for more transparency and a better accountability mechanism.  
 
III. A Proposal for Self-Imposed Conditionality 
 
A. Outline of Self-Imposed Conditionality  
 
At the heart of the proposal I set out below lies the need for a mechanism that gives greater 
weight to the economic sovereignty of member countries. Member countries should be able to 
choose from among a range of reasonable economic policies those that are most consistent with 
their national aspirations and traditions. The thrust of the proposal is procedural reform. Because 
the jurisdictional lines of the Fund’s authority are too difficult to draw and there is no review 
mechanism to ensure that the Fund does not exceed its jurisdiction, it is better to formulate a 
procedure that allows member countries a greater say in designing the conditions.  
Accordingly, countries that apply to the Fund for a loan should be able to determine the type 
of conditions that that country is committed to implementing. The country will make a 
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submission to the Fund detailing the conditions it proposes to include in the loan agreement, 
including the reasons and facts on which the proposal is based. Countries will thus have a right 
of ‘first proposal’ and the opportunity to impose conditions on themselves.  
The Fund will have the power to review the submission made by the country, but it will have 
to accept that submission and make the loan on the proposed conditions unless they fail to 
comply with certain specified grounds of review. The Fund will conduct a swift procedure under 
which it will determine whether the proposed conditions are consistent with specific standards. 
The main ground of review is reasonableness. Conditions proposed by member countries have to 
meet the standard of reasonableness. Countries will also have to satisfy certain procedural 
requirements: they will have to make adequate disclosure of the facts that form the basis for their 
policy proposals; they will have to state the reasons for the suggested conditions; and they may 
have to make specific consultations.64 If the Fund decides that the proposed conditions fail to 
satisfy one of the grounds of review, then it can step in and propose its own conditions.65  
The Fund has to give reasons for its decisions and explain why they withstand or fail to 
withstand the standard of reasonableness. The reasons should include references to past cases of 
conditionality as well as ex post reviews conducted by the Fund (and also, presumably, by the 
IEO). The submissions made to the Fund, the Fund’s decisions and the reasons for the decisions 
will be published. Thus, instead of a confidential process, the Fund’s decisions will be open and 
susceptible to public and academic scrutiny.66  
Additionally, the Fund will have to provide countries with technical assistance as well as 
allow countries to use its resources and information data-base when making submissions. 
Finally, member countries will be able to waive their right to design the conditions in 
circumstances where it would be impractical for them to make a submission.  
                                                 
64 The nature and extent of these grounds of review are discussed below.  
65 Of course, the country applying to the Fund can always decide not to use the Fund’s resources or try to further 
negotiate with the Fund over the content of the conditions.  
66 The timing of publication is subject to further debate. See the discussion in section III(G) below. 
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B. Advantages of the Proposal over the Current System  
 
The proposal for self-imposed conditionality has several advantages over the current practice 
of conditionality, many of which address the specific criticisms raised above.   
 
1. Economic Sovereignty  
 
The proposal creates a new balance between the sovereignty of member countries and the Fund’s 
power to intervene in a country’s internal affairs. The suggested process ensures that countries 
have the opportunity to design conditions as they consider best for emerging out of financial 
crises and regaining their credibility in financial markets. It ensures that if there are several 
reasonable and legitimate economic steps that can be taken to address the crisis, the affected 
country can choose the one that is consistent with its national aspirations and traditions. Subject 
to the Fund’s review powers, countries also have a choice with regard to the scope of the 
proposed conditions. Conditions can equally include an extensive range of economic activities 
and reforms or minimal steps that concern only a narrow range of issues.67 Accordingly, the 
proposal reflects the value of ownership as expressed in the Guidelines on Conditionality and 
gives it a formal underpinning.    
 
2. Economic Plurality and Increased Participation 
 
Subject to the Fund’s review powers, the proposal assumes that different countries may choose 
to adopt different economic policies, even if the problems in those countries are similar in nature. 
The Fund will have to consider the countries’ preferences of economic choices and will not be 
able to deny assistance merely on the basis of having different preferences. The Fund will review 
the countries’ submissions and determine whether they are reasonable. Naturally, other countries 
will get some idea of how the grounds of review are applied. They can criticize the process, 
                                                 
67 If the country proposes too many conditions, the Fund may in its decision indicate which conditions it considers 
critical for the program.  
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demanding more respect for their autonomy, or alternatively they may seek to improve their 
arguments to the Fund or distinguish their case from those of other countries.  
 The openness of the new procedure will create a deliberative process between the Fund and 
member countries based on emerging case-studies. This deliberative process will enhance mutual 
study of the economies of different countries and regions, of the feasibility of different economic 
solutions to commonly shared problems, and of the economic measures necessary in crisis 
situations. At present, deliberation and cross-learning are not strong, in the absence of accessible 
and regularized ex post review of Fund programs and the lack of a consistent record of 
submissions, negotiations and internal documents explaining the rationale of Fund programs. A 
deliberative process will also enhance the legitimacy of conditionality because of the increased 
participation of developing countries in designing and shaping the practice of conditionality. 
Thus developing countries will have an avenue of participation in the process of increasing 
global welfare and the study of economics, while the Fund’s authority will be given a new source 
of legitimacy. 
 
3. More Effective Prescriptions  
 
The proposal is likely to strengthen the effectiveness of conditionality in two material respects. 
First, it mitigates the problem of the Fund’s imperfect knowledge of countries’ internal affairs. 
Governments that make submissions to the Fund may have a better knowledge of the nature of 
domestic political, economic and social problems and the political feasibility of potential 
economic reforms than the Fund’s staff.68 The proposal ensures that governments have the 
opportunity to present their solution in a formal and transparent manner. Of course, the external 
expertise of the Fund may be vital to inducing critical reforms, but the Fund’s expertise will be 
                                                 
68 As Stiglitz says, if conditions are likely to lead to social insurgence then the borrower country will clearly suffer 
in financial markets and fail to recover. See Stiglitz, above footnote 8, at 119-120.  
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given effect when it reviews countries’ submissions. Second, the effectiveness of program design 
will also be enhanced by the gradual emergence of standards generated by the application of 
reasonableness and the extended scope for ex post review. From one case to another, it is 
expected that reasonableness review will develop into a more concrete and detailed range of 
standards pertaining to specific economic issues and situations. Such standards will guide 
countries that make submissions to the Fund and, more importantly, countries that wish to avoid 
financial instability. Third, ex post review of Fund programs is likely to be more effective than in 
the current system because of the availability of better records of countries’ submissions, the 
Fund’s decisions and the reasons and facts that underlie them. The Fund will also use such 
reviews and all relevant records in justifying and explaining the rationale for its decisions. A 
more reasoned decision-making process based on past cases and results will improve the quality 
of program design.  
4. Better Prospects for Reform  
 
As discussed above, owned policies have better chances of being implemented than externally-
imposed policies. Policies submitted by governments without the Fund’s direct intervention are 
likely to enjoy a higher level of ownership. Thus, the rates of compliance with Fund conditions 
are likely to increase. In addition, countries will have greater incentive than in the current system 
to engage in economic reform. Governments have an inherent incentive to maintain control over 
their economic policies. In order to do this, they would have to submit to the Fund a reasonable 
program. Thus, a government that wishes to retain control over the reform process will have an 
incentive to formulate reasonable programs that address the relevant issues that require reform. 
Understanding that they will have to commit to certain conditions anyway, governments may 
prefer to design the conditions themselves rather than let the Fund intervene in their affairs.69   
                                                 
69 I deal below with the argument that the informality and confidentiality of the negotiation process is necessary to 
induce countries to agree to make reforms they would otherwise be unable to accept because of internal opposition 
to such reforms.  
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5. Greater Incentive to Disclose Information  
 
The governments’ interest in retaining control over the substance of proposed reform will also 
provide incentives to countries to disclose information to the Fund about economic conditions in 
these countries. The Fund will need sufficient information in order to be convinced of the 
reasonableness of the proposal. Countries making submissions to the Fund will have to provide 
the Fund with sufficient information to enable the Fund to review the proposal. For example, if a 
country proposes a change to its banking regulation, then the government will have to provide 
the Fund with information regarding the deficiencies in current regulation and why the 
government expects the proposed changes to solve the problems. Accordingly, countries are 
likely to release more information on their economic and regulatory frameworks. 
 
6. Transparency and Accountability  
 
The proposal improves the transparency and accountability of the Fund’s decision-making 
process. Submissions made by member countries and the Fund’s decisions, including the reasons 
for these decisions, will be published.  
Transparency will no doubt facilitate and encourage criticism of the Fund’s operation by all 
stakeholders involved in the process. Thus it is likely to enhance the accountability of the Fund 
to member countries, their citizens, and the public at large. The flow of information that the 
process will generate will be used by academics, practitioners, NGOs and civil society to assess 
the Fund’s role. This process will also be aided by the increased use and effectiveness of ex post 
reviews of the Fund’s operations – whether by the IEO, academics, or the Fund itself. Such 
reviews will further help in assessing the Fund’s operations by professionals and laymen alike. 
Although there will be no judicial review mechanism of the Fund’s decisions, the Fund is very 
conscious of its pubic image, and failure to follow due process or bad decision-making is likely 
to lead to external pressure on the Fund to change its course.   
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Transparency is also a powerful tool in building the credibility of conditionality. The IEO 
stresses the importance of communicating the logic of program design to the market and 
disclosing all relevant information both by the Fund and member countries. It specifically 
recommends the publication of staff reports supporting the countries’ requests for use of Fund 
resources, i.e., the reasons and justifications for the program. Such publication will help achieve 
broader domestic support and stronger ownership of program design during a crisis, as well as 
restore market confidence.70  
In addition, the credibility of program design will be strengthened because the political 
influence of major shareholders within a transparent procedure will be limited. 71 The Fund will 
have to base its decisions on technical assessments of risks and trade-offs and its reasoning will 
be published. Although political considerations inevitably affect the process and the opinions of 
Board members, their influence will be constrained by the requirement to explain decisions by 
reference to specific standards.   
Better transparency and accountability will increase the legitimacy of the conditionality 
process. Where the conditions proposed by the applying country withstand the Fund’s review, 
they will clearly be perceived as legitimate, assuming the Fund is not too lenient in exercising its 
review. Where the Fund insists on its own conditions, the furnishing of reasons for its decision in 
accordance with specific standards and lessons learned from past cases will legitimate the Fund’s 
intervention.  
 
                                                 
70 IEO (2003a), above footnote 28, at 43-44, 50-51: ‘In this effort of building credibility, transparency is a useful 
tool. In a capital account crisis, the IMF does not necessarily have more information than the private sector. Without 
disclosure of critical information for the investors, for example concerning the financing assumptions, or how 
policies might be adjusted to evolving developments, it is difficult to expect the markets to perceive the program to 
be credible.’   
71 See IEO (2002), above footnote 28, at 15-16: ‘The appearance of undue political intervention in the IMF’s 
decisions to grant a country access to its resources undermines the credibility of programs. Procedures should be 
evolved so that political considerations, which are inevitably present in these decisions, are seen to be taken into 
account in a transparent manner, with decisions and accountability clearly at the level of the Executive Board on the 
basis of a candid technical assessment by staff of the risk and potential trade-offs.’  
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C. The Fund’s Review Powers - the Grounds of Review 
 
Reform of conditionality depends in large part on the content of the suggested grounds of review 
and on the manner in which the Fund would exercise them. The underlying rationale for these 
grounds of review and their exercise is twofold: on the one hand, they ought to ensure adequate 
respect for countries’ economic sovereignty and economic plurality; and on the other hand, they 
ought to ensure responsible lending and that the Fund is repaid its debt.  
The suggested grounds of review are largely modeled on the typical grounds of review that 
exist in domestic administrative laws. Although there is no clear-cut distinction between 
procedural and substantive grounds of review, it is useful for the purpose of exposition to deal 
with them separately.  
 
1. Procedural Grounds of Review 
 
Procedural grounds of review are designed to ensure that decisions are made in an informed and 
reasoned manner. They are of great importance because of the inevitable uncertainty of 
substantive review of economic decision-making, and because they induce good policy-making 
and reduce the need for scrutinizing the substance of the proposed conditions. On the other hand, 
if the procedural requirements are too stringent and restrictive, they may lead to undue delays 
and administrative costs.  
a. Disclosure and sufficient factual basis: Submissions to the Fund must be supported by 
relevant and accurate facts to enable the country to make an informed policy choice. For 
example, if the country proposes to make a cut in its budget, it will have to specify how this will 
be done, what kind of expenses are going to be reduced, and, where relevant, how the country 
will deal with these cuts, e.g., through increased efficiency and savings. The member country 
will also have to disclose relevant facts concerning its economy. Following the above example, it 
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will have to disclose relevant figures regarding its budget in former years and why it considers 
the former budget plan to have been unsuccessful.  
b. All relevant considerations must be taken into account: A country must give at least some 
weight to all relevant considerations. This is a standard ground of review in administrative law. 
The more difficult question concerns the weight that a country ought to give to each relevant 
consideration under the standard of reasonableness.  
c. Reasons: A submission to the Fund must specify the reasons for the suggested conditions. 
The country will therefore have to justify its policy choices. It is important to emphasize again 
that the submission, including the reasons that underlie it, will be published.72 Thus they will 
form not only the basis for the Fund’s substantive review of the submission, but also the basis for 
public, political and academic scrutiny of its content. Where the Fund does not accept the 
proposal, these reasons may be highly important in assessing the wisdom of the conditions which 
the Fund will later determine. Additionally, the Fund may pay regard to these reasons when 
formulating its own conditions even if it does not approve the country’s proposed conditions - 
perhaps because they may direct the Fund to a new issue that it would otherwise not consider. 
d. Consultations: Presumably, reasonable proposals will be prepared by professional 
economists of sufficient experience and education. In fact, member countries increasingly 
engage investment banks when dealing with the Fund. It is questionable, though, whether there 
should be a formal requirement to consult with qualified economists. If a submission is 
reasonable, then arguably it should not matter whether or not it was prepared in consultation with 
economists of sufficient pedigree. Nonetheless, there is merit in requiring each submission to be 
accompanied by a report or recommendation by economists that support the proposed conditions, 
including a formal certification that they consider the proposed conditions to be reasonable.73 
The main benefit of such a requirement is that it lends more force to the country’s proposal. It 
                                                 
72 I deal with the timing of publication in sub-section III(G).  
73 The exact wording of the certification is not significant for the present discussion.  
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will be more difficult for the Fund to claim that a proposal is unreasonable when qualified 
economists express a different view. It increases the chances that countries will meet the grounds 
of review, because such economists would speak the same language as the Fund and be better 
able to preempt its response. 
There are, however, several difficulties with such a requirement. For example, some 
countries may not be able to afford prominent economists. More importantly, the question arises 
as to which economists should serve this role and whose interests they should represent. The 
answer must start with a specification of professional requirements. Thus, economists must have 
certain relevant education and experience in economics. Naturally, this requirement will be 
supervised by the Fund. But it must be ensured that economists from developing countries 
educated in those countries are given a fair chance to meet the professional criteria, and they 
need not enjoy international acclaim and reputation.74 
Second, the Fund may maintain a pool of economists that specialize in macro-economic 
issues, especially emerging markets and developing countries. The question then will be, who 
will appoint these economists?75 As stated above, sometimes domestic understanding of internal 
problems is essential for their resolution, and sometimes external intervention is necessary to 
bring about a shift in policy because domestic actors are reluctant to make desirable changes that 
militate against traditional norms. To give expression to both internal expertise and external 
scrutiny, such economists should include largely two groups: economists appointed by 
                                                 
74 It is noteworthy international acclaim and the reputation of economic advisers has not been a guarantee for the 
success of economic policy-making. In the Russian crisis, the government retained a reputable consultancy firm; yet 
many of the reform initiatives turned out to be misguided or badly implemented.  
75 Another question is, who will pay their fees? Ideally, the Fund would be able to subsidize these fees so that 
developing countries with limited funds can use their services. But recent requests by the Fund for more financial 
support from member countries suggest that the Fund’s resources may be limited. Possibly, they could be paid on a 
contingency fee basis, i.e., out of the benefits of economic recovery and subject to economic recovery. But such a 
solution can be very problematic; in particular, it may be an incentive for under-qualified economists to propose 
their services to developing countries.  
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developing countries76 and economists appointed by the Fund.77 The question then would be, 
what is the right ratio between Fund economists and economists appointed by developing 
countries? I leave this question open for future discussion, as it is not fundamental to the 
proposal.78  
Finally, it should be noted that if a process of making submissions and consultations is 
formalized and institutionalized, there will be greater incentive and demand for economists to 
engage in economic issues that concern developing countries. Moreover, developing countries 
will have an incentive to train more economists for this specific role in order to maintain their 
control over their economic policy-making. Alternatively, countries with sufficient means may 
continue to engage large investment banks and law firms in drafting submissions and negotiating 
with the Fund.79   
 
2. Substantive Grounds of Review - Reasonableness 
 
The main ground of review is the standard of reasonableness. Member countries must propose 
conditions which are reasonable to achieve their aim. The traditional standard of reasonableness 
seeks to strike down only decisions which no reasonable authority would consider reasonable. 
Thus, in traditional administrative law the standard of reasonableness is designed to intercept 
                                                 
76 It is not essential for present purposes to decide how exactly this would be done. For example, the government 
may appoint economists when it approaches the Fund, or alternatively it may appoint them to the pool in advance 
and use their services when seeking the Fund’s assistance.  
77 It may be argued that the Fund’s review powers over the substance of proposed conditions are sufficient for the 
purpose of giving expression to external viewpoints. On this view, there should be no need for countries to consult 
appointees of the Fund. Member countries will enjoy the advantage of feeling as free as possible to formulate any 
policy they consider best without any external influence. On the other hand, consultation with the Fund may be 
important in the early stage. The Fund’s appointees can raise various concerns that the Fund may have with regard 
to suggested conditions; they can help the domestic team understand the Fund’s requirements; and they can be 
responsible for maintaining informal channels to the Fund. It is important to emphasize that the Fund’s appointees 
will be employed by the country and owe duties of care, diligence and confidentiality to the country rather than the 
Fund.  
78 My intuition, though, is that an appropriate ratio is 2:1 in favor of economists appointed by developing countries. 
The reason for this is that the Fund’s economists will have an opportunity to make their impact anyway in reviewing 
the country’s proposal.  
79 That some countries can afford to engage large investment banks when dealing with the Fund raises concerns 
about equality. Arguably, countries with insufficient means to engage prominent institutions will receive less 
deferential treatment by the Fund. The idea of maintaining a pool of economists appointed by developing countries, 
whose employment is subsidized by the Fund, is likely to solve this problem.  
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only decisions that are so egregious as to amount to illegal acts. The underlying principle is that 
the reviewing body does not seek to substitute for the judgment of the decision-maker.80 
This proposal advocates a different and wider form of reasonableness review. The Fund 
should be able to substitute for the judgment of the applying country to a larger extent than is 
permitted pursuant to traditional notions of administrative law. The reason for this is simple. 
There is hardly any question concerning the legality of economic policy-making. Rather, the 
Fund has a duty to ensure the sufficiency of the steps undertaken by the countries that seek its 
assistance. The crucial issue therefore is whether the proposed conditions are substantively 
justified and whether they are likely to achieve the aims for which they were formulated. In other 
words, the Fund will examine whether the country’s proposal gives due weight to all relevant 
considerations, and not merely whether it is egregious.  
The reasonableness standard begs the question of reasonable as to what, or in other words, 
what are the aims of conditionality? The new Guidelines on Conditionality define the aims of 
Fund programs as primarily (1) solving members’ balance of payment problems and (2) 
achieving medium-term external viability while fostering sustainable growth.81 Presumably, 
these aims will continue to apply. In any case, whatever formal definition of the aims of 
conditionality is adopted, it is extremely important that these aims be clearly defined and that 
                                                 
80 Although this principle has to some extent been compromised in domestic systems, such as the US and the UK, 
and judges do tend to encroach upon administrative powers.   
81 Section A(6) of the Guidelines on Conditionality. Note that the wording of the Guidelines is somewhat ambiguous 
as to whether fostering growth is an independent aim of conditionality, or merely incidental to achieving medium-
term external viability. Whereas solving balance of payments problems and reducing vulnerability to future crises 
are generally uncontested goals of conditionality, the goal of fostering sustainable growth has been particularly 
questionable. Potentially, almost anything can be included within the goal of fostering sustainable growth. 
Goldstein, above footnote 6, argues that conditionality should be directed only towards solving the current crisis and 
reducing vulnerability to future crises. Whether or not fostering growth is part of the Fund’s mission is not 
fundamental to the proposal set out in this paper because the essence of the proposal is procedural reform. However, 
it should be pointed out that this issue will clearly have a significant effect on the balance of power between the 
Fund and member countries. A good case can be made for an expansive definition of the goals of conditionality here 
because members will have a right of first proposal. On the other hand, others see growth issues as outside the ambit 
of the Fund’s expertise. In practice, however, the Fund already routinely engages in growth matters through its 
various activities, and some facilities, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, are concerned specifically 
with growth issues. One solution perhaps would be to classify facilities as either growth facilities or non-growth 
facilities limited to solving balance of payment issues and reducing vulnerability to crises. Countries would then 
choose for themselves which facilities they wish to apply for, and reasonableness review would be applied in 
accordance with the terms and aims of each facility.  
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reasonableness always be applied by reference to these aims.82 Otherwise, the process of 
explaining decisions and applying reasonableness will become arbitrary and unprincipled.   
There may be some degree of skepticism with regard to the practicality of substantive review 
of economic decision-making. Two main concerns merit discussion. First, in domestic systems 
there is ample criticism of the opaqueness and uncertainty of the reasonableness test.83 For 
example, it is often argued that reasonableness review conceals the level of judges’ intervention 
in the substance of administrative decision-making and the grounds for such intervention. 
However, most of the criticisms of reasonableness review have to be understood against the 
function of judicial review, which is to review the legality rather than the wisdom of 
administrative actions. By contrast, the suggested reasonableness review is not amenable to such 
criticisms because it expressly allows the Fund to consider the substance of the proposed 
conditions and the weight countries give to each relevant consideration. Unlike the traditional 
administrative law standard, reasonableness, in this context, is largely identical with its common 
meaning rather than its ‘legal’ meaning.  
Nonetheless, there would still be considerable scope for uncertainty because it cannot always 
be clear whether a proposal is reasonable to achieve its aims. In addition, the same jurisdictional 
uncertainly regarding the scope of the Fund’s authority and the risk of ‘mission creep’ will 
persist as under the present system. The difficult questions concerning what is necessary to 
reduce vulnerability or foster growth, and what structural measures are critical, will remain.   
But, although these difficult questions will no doubt persist, the proposal for self-imposed 
conditionality offers a more effective way of clarifying and elucidating the answers to them. The 
understandings – of what counts and what does not count as reasonable for restoring viability 
and fostering growth in certain circumstances – are likely to emerge out of a growing body of 
                                                 
82 In its website, the Fund defines the aims of conditionality somewhat more loosely than in the Guidelines on 
Conditionality to include laying the basis for sustainable growth by achieving broader economic stability. See 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm (last visited 24 January 2005).  
83 For a notable example on English law, see Jeffrey Jowell & Anthony Lester, ‘Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive 
Principles of Administrative Law’, Public Law (1987), 368.   
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case-studies and precedents. The Fund will not be bound by previous determinations, but it will 
have to use past cases and ex post reviews to justify its decisions when reviewing proposed 
conditions. These precedents will be constantly published and reviewed by laymen and 
professionals alike, and will thereby contribute to shared learning of economic issues as well as 
improve the consistency of Fund decisions. Similar to the way that case-law develops into a 
coherent body of rules, the Fund and member countries will learn by trial and error what 
constitutes a reasonable economic policy in circumstances of financial distress. 
In addition, other means can be adopted to counteract potential uncertainties. The Fund can 
be required to take into account specified considerations in assessing the reasonableness of 
proposed conditions, such as the benefits and costs of the proposal, critical vulnerabilities of the 
domestic economy, the probability and political feasibility of implementation, risks and 
uncertainties, possible alternative measures, distributional effects, etc. Another possible 
consideration would be whether the proposed conditions themselves are consistent with various 
international standards.84 It may also be helpful for the Fund to formulate some kind of 
guidelines as to what it is likely to consider reasonable, preferably by reference to specific 
precedents. These guidelines may add some certainty to the procedure, but it is important to keep 
them very flexible in order to leave space for member countries to make their own contribution 
to the process. Finally, the practical content of the reasonableness standard will be 
                                                 
84 As Goldstein, above footnote 6, at 75, points out, a potential appeal of standards is that they represent the 
consensus on good practice by a group of international experts rather than the views of an individual mission chief 
or the Fund. In fact, the Fund is already using standards in designing loan conditions. See 
http://imf.org/external/standards/index.htm (last visited 22 December 2004). On the other hand, others have 
expressed concerns about the limited participation of developing countries in forming international standards and 
argue that such standards may not be conducive to the economies of developing countries. See Katharina Pistor, 
‘The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing Countries’,  Am. J. Comp. L., Vol. 50 (2002), 97; Herbert 
V. Morais, ‘The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs. Sovereignty’, U. Kan. L. Rev., Vol. 50 
(2002), 779. The advantage of self-imposed conditionality is that developing countries have the opportunity to 
participate in the process of creating international standards by making reasoned submissions to the Fund. 
Developing countries would also be able to argue that the application of international standards in a specific 
situation is not desirable and explain their position.  
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complemented by the Fund’s surveillance role, under which it already provides economic advice 
to countries.85  
The second concern is that the concept of ‘reasonableness review’ of economic policy-
making is rather novel and arguably workable. Several examples may be helpful to demonstrate 
the viability and potential of policy review. First, there are domestic agencies that are involved in 
the review of policy-making, for example, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an 
agency of the President of the United States. The OMB’s function is to review cost-benefit 
analyses of proposed regulation prepared by every regulatory agency in accordance with the 
Presidential Orders.86 Its role is to discipline regulatory decision-making and eliminate 
unjustified regulation through cost-benefit analysis and centralized review, i.e., it essentially 
regulates other regulators.87 As pointed out by Stewart, although the OMB regulatory analysis 
was initially controversial, it has become widely accepted by all administrations, Republican as 
well as Democrat, and has become an integral part of US administrative law.88  
The OMB is not a perfect analogy,89 but it bears several similarities to my proposal. First, 
OMB review involves review of the substance of policy-making by economists and lawyers. In 
fact, it is more controversial than the idea of Fund review, because the OMB has to deal with 
regulation in various fields of which it has very little knowledge. The Fund’s economists, on the 
other hand, have significant expertise in reviewing economic policy-making and making 
reasoned judgments on the relevant strengths and weaknesses of economic policies. In addition, 
like the Fund, OMB decisions are not subject to judicial review, and its function is designed to 
                                                 
85 The IEO stresses the importance of high-quality surveillance to facilitate a better understanding of what would be 
expected of authorities if Fund assistance becomes necessary. It also says that surveillance reports should seek to 
actively present alternative policy options and to analyze the trade-offs between them. See IEO (2002), above 
footnote 28, at 84. 
86 Stephen G. Breyer, Richard B. Stewart, Cass R. Sunstein & Matthew L. Spitzer, Administrative Law and 
Regulatory Policy, 5th ed. (Aspen Law & Business, 2002), at 120-144 (hereinafter referred to as Breyer & Stewart).  
87 Stewart, above footnote 1.  
88 Ibid.  
89 The OMB deals with cost-benefit analyses of regulation as opposed to economic policy-making in circumstances 
of financial crisis.  
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improve decision-making rather than create rights and benefits enforceable by any person.90 
Accordingly, the integration and centrality of OMB review in the US regulatory process suggests 
that the Fund’s review of proposed policies may be a successful mechanism that will help 
improve economic policy-making in developing countries. 
Second, the allocation of power over policy-making under my proposal is analogous to the 
manner in which the European Community (EC) formulates and administers the implementation 
of directives. Directives are legislative measures binding on member states as to the result to be 
achieved.91 They determine certain targets, usually relating to various economic and regulatory 
matters. National authorities reserve, however, the right to choose the form and method of 
implementing these targets. Both the EC Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
perform actions, which are similar to the Fund’s review under my proposal. Both effectively 
consider whether countries’ policies are reasonable for achieving a target specified in the 
directives. The EC Commission has to make a determination as to whether a member state has 
satisfied the requirements of the directives when it considers whether to bring proceedings 
against a member state.92 The ECJ has to make the same determination in cases of alleged 
infringements of a directive.93 Although EC directives are not a perfect analogy to the Fund’s 
review because they serve different purposes,94 they do support the argument that reviewing 
economic and regulatory policies can be an effective procedure. 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the extent to which the Fund should take into account 
interests and considerations that do not directly concern the economy of the applying country. 
Possibly, the Fund should consider the interests of other member countries and international 
                                                 
90 Breyer & Stewart, above footnote 86.  
91 Article 249 EC.  
92 Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2002), at 
407-412. It is also noteworthy that, pursuant to Article 226 EC, the Commission has to deliver a reasoned opinion to 
a member state which it considers to have failed to implement a directive.  
93 See generally, Craig & De Burca, Ibid., at 202-229.  
94 The purpose of the directives is to harmonize legislation within the EC. The purpose of the grounds of review is to 
make sure that member countries commit to sound economic policies.  
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financial markets. An important consideration is whether the proposed policy is likely to 
endanger or injure another economy. For example, a major devaluation of the currency in one 
country may affect other economies. Another issue may be the consistency of proposed policies 
with the countries’ international obligations pursuant to other international systems. For 
example, a policy is unreasonable if it includes an increase in tariffs contrary to binding WTO 
rules. Also, the Fund should possibly be able to take into account the environmental effects of 
economic policy-making or even the human-rights record of member countries where relevant.  
 
 
 
 
D. The Procedure for Applying to the Fund 
 
The procedure for applying to the Fund is significant for the efficiency of the application 
mechanism. There is no need to describe it in detail for the purposes of this paper, but some 
critical issues that the application procedure must address should be highlighted.  
First, the procedure for application by written submissions and review by the Fund has to be 
expeditious, especially in emergency situations where the need for money is acute. Emphasis 
must be placed on a swift, organized procedure with a focus on a speedy review mechanism and 
strict deadlines. Parts of the submissions probably should be communicated to the Fund as they 
are formulated, and the Fund should be able to give some informal indications as to the 
reasonableness of proposed measures. Maintaining informal channels between countries and the 
Fund can facilitate agreement and prevent clashes. The Fund will also have a duty to provide 
technical assistance to countries and access to its information data-base.  
Second, a decision need be taken in regard to what exactly member countries will have to 
submit. Several items or preparatory work need be considered, for example: does a country have 
to submit alternatives for its proposed conditions, explaining why they are less beneficial? Does 
it have to submit a full cost-benefit analysis? Would it have to point out potential difficulties of 
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its proposal? Does it have to verify each of the figures that it supplies to the Fund, and in what 
way? As said above, account has to be taken of the need for expediency. It may be better to leave 
these issues to the discretion of the Fund. They can be considered by the Fund when exercising 
its review powers. By applying the standard of reasonableness, the Fund could develop these 
procedural requirements incrementally on the basis of precedents. In some instances limited 
information may be sufficient, and in others when time is less pressing the Fund can demand 
more explanations. 
Third, the question arises as to who bears the burden of satisfying the grounds of review: the 
Fund or the country applying to the Fund? The countries will have to bear this burden for all 
practical purposes, as the Fund cannot be compelled to give away money unless it is persuaded 
that the proposed conditions are reasonable. The main sanction against the Fund, if it uses 
reasonableness too strictly or fails to give adequate reasons for its decisions, is public censure 
and public pressure to change its conduct. It may be possible to initiate an independent review 
mechanism by an advisory committee that will adjudicate disputes between the Fund and 
member countries. But such a procedure may lead to over-formalization, increase administrative 
costs, and create excessive delays in the Fund’s operation.  
Fourth, some solution will have to be provided for cases in which countries propose too 
many conditions when making submissions – perhaps in order to signal to the market an 
exaggerated willingness to launch reform. The IEO has warned against programs ‘over-
promising’ on a range of structural reforms and the time frame for their implementation, 
especially when such reforms have no serious political backing. Such over-promising has 
weakened the credibility of Fund programs because it inevitably leads to an impression of poor 
implementation and poor program design.95 As recognized in the Guidelines on Conditionality, 
conditions should be limited to those critical to achieving the aims of Fund programs. A 
                                                 
95 See IEO (2002), above footnote 28.  
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plausible solution is that the Fund will indicate which conditions, out of those proposed by the 
country, will be regarded as critical and binding and which policies are not to be part of the 
program. The Fund will monitor only the former. 
Fifth, a country whose submission has been rejected by the Fund will not be able to make a 
revised submission immediately following the Fund’s decision. Otherwise, knowing they can 
always re-submit an application, countries will have an incentive to commit to minimal 
conditions in the hope that the Fund might accept them. A time-frame will have to be 
determined, following which re-submission would be possible. On the other hand, if the program 
requires only minor modifications, it may be returned to the country with comments for re-
submission within a short period.  
Finally, as pointed out by Bhagwati, economic programs almost always suffer from 
uncertainty or face unanticipated problems.96 Accordingly, even when the Fund approves a 
country’s submission, the Fund – with the country’s cooperation – should formulate contingency 
plans in accordance with risks identified prior to program implementation.97 Such contingency 
plans will be kept confidential, but will be used once the initial policies fail or require 
modification.     
 
IV. Potential Problems with the Proposal, Replies and Suggested Solutions: 
 
The proposal for self-imposed conditionality is admittedly imperfect. In the following 
discussions I deal with potential problems with the proposal. Each sub-section raises a potential 
problem, followed by a discussion of the problem. Some of these problems are relevant 
exclusively to this proposal, whereas others may be equally relevant to the current practice of 
conditionality.  
 
                                                 
96 Bhagwati, above footnote 34, at 260-261.  
97 The IEO has stressed the importance of contingency planning to the success of Fund programs.  
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A. Those Who Created the Problem Should Not Be the Ones Entrusted with 
Solving it  
 
A legitimate criticism of the proposal may be that the government that put a country in a difficult 
financial position should not be in charge of designing the policies for economic recovery. On 
this view, member countries should be subjected to the Fund’s conditions partly because they 
have manifested irresponsible economic policy-making. Such a view is misguided for several 
reasons.  
First, it may be that the government whose actions contributed to the creation of large debts 
has been replaced, or that the current government has made only little contribution to enlarging 
the national debt. Second, the government itself may not bear the prime responsibility for the 
difficult economic situation. In a global world, countries, especially small ones, may be affected 
by various changes in financial markets with very limited means of mitigating the effects of 
these changes. Contagions, the spread of market dislocation from one country to the next, were 
frequently the main cause of crises in the 1990s.   
Third, the idea of a defaulter that is given the latitude to recover from distress or from failure 
to perform its legal obligations has been recognized in other legal frameworks, such as Chapter 
11 and Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code. The main feature of Chapter 11 is that the debtor 
remains in control of its assets. In the case of corporations-debtors, the old directors and officers, 
known collectively as the ‘debtor in possession,’ normally remain in their positions.98 They 
continue to run the business and enjoy almost all the rights of the trustee, including the right to 
sell and lease property and the right to borrow money.99 Chapter 9, which deals with 
bankruptcies of municipalities, is even more deferential to debtors. The debtor-municipality 
remains in charge of the city’s affairs, including its financial matters, and the bankruptcy court 
                                                 
98 11 United States Code Annotated (U.S.C.A.) § 1104. 
99 11 United States Code Annotated (U.S.C.A.) §§ 1106-1108.  
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cannot interfere with any of the debtor’s political or governmental powers, any of the debtor’s 
property or revenues, or the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing property, unless 
the debtor consents or the plan so provides.100  
Fourth, the Fund expressly acknowledges the importance of member countries retaining 
ownership of the substance of conditions. This is most prominently reflected in the Guidelines on 
Conditionality. As discussed above, the Guidelines expressly state that the domestic government 
should be in charge of selecting and designing the conditions, as well as drafting the letter of 
intent.101 Given that the Fund itself assumes a leading role for the defaulting government, the 
proposal effectively assures that the Fund will follow what it currently claims to be its own 
policy.102  
Fifth, the Fund and the World Bank have already initiated a formal program for inducing 
member countries to improve their own policy-making, namely the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF). Under PRGF, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are prepared 
by member countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as 
external development partners, such as the Fund and the World Bank. PRSPs describe the 
country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs over a three-year or longer 
horizon to promote growth and reduce poverty. The country’s documents, accompanied by 
assessments made by the joint staff of the Fund and the World Bank, are published on a 
website.103 These nationally-owned PRSPs provide the basis of all World Bank and Fund 
concessional lending and for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
                                                 
100 11 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 904. See also Kevin A. Kordana, ‘Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies’, 
Va. L. Rev., Vol. 83 (1997), 1035.  
101 See also IEO (2002), above footnote 28, at 14,83. It is also noteworthy that, at least formally, countries have 
always drafted their own conditions in the Letter of Intent submitted to the Fund. The Letter of Intent was 
traditionally written by the country seeking the Fund’s assistance, but, as discussed above, the Fund’s intervention 
has gradually increased.   
102 The Fund has already started to move toward a procedure in which the country seeking assistance makes the 
initial reform proposal. For example, the recent letter of intent by Peru, dated 25 May 2004, was originally drafted 
and submitted to the Fund by the Peruvian government. But, as discussed above, such a procedure has not been 
formalized in the sense that countries have a right to make a recorded submission to which the Fund must respond in 
a reasoned and transparent manner.  
103 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp (last visited 8 December 2004)  
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(HIPC) Initiative. Countries are expected to commit to reducing poverty in accordance with their 
own economic policies as a condition for receiving debt relief. 
Experience with the SPRPs has been mixed, with some success. With regard to ownership, 
concerns have been raised that countries are forced to propose the same policies that the Fund 
would otherwise impose.104 The IEO’s recent report suggests that there has been considerable 
widening of the policy space afforded to member countries, although the Fund continues to be 
overtly prescriptive in several areas and the level of ownership varies across countries.105 In 
addition, some of the IEO’s recommendations support the key elements of self-imposed 
conditionality. Apart from the need to further enhance ownership and afford more policy space 
to countries, the IEO recommends, inter alia, that both countries’ and Fund policies should be 
subject to more public scrutiny, that the Fund joint assessments with the World Bank of 
countries’ PRSPs should be more principled and refer to specific criteria, and that the rationale 
and reasons for IMF policies should be more clearly stated in program documents.  
Finally, even under my proposal the Fund retains the power to invoke its intrusive powers. 
The exercise of such powers may be necessary in certain circumstances, especially when a 
country consistently fails to implement conditions in loan agreements or insists on pursuing 
policies that are likely to lead to financial crisis. In such cases, giving a sovereign country an 
opportunity to rectify the situation itself before the Fund actively intervenes will legitimize the 
Fund’s involvement in that country’s internal affairs.   
 
B. Countries May Not Have the Power and Resources to Make Submissions 
to the IMF 
 
Some countries have very limited means and resources, to the extent that they would be unable 
to make their own detailed submissions to the Fund. In some countries there is a scarcity of the 
                                                 
104 See Stiglitz, above footnote 8, at 50-51; Eurodad, above footnote 31; Wood, above footnote 31. These concerns 
are also relevant to my proposal. I deal below with the possibility that the Fund will use reasonableness review to 
impose its views on member countries.    
105 Independent Evaluation Office, IMF, ‘Evaluation of the IMF’s Role in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility’ (2004).  
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most basic resources. However, several arguments should be raised in this context. First, the 
proposal provides for countries to waive their right to make submissions and accept the Fund’s 
jurisdiction. Following a waiver, the Fund would act on a footing similar to the current system. 
Second, the Fund is able to grant technical assistance to member countries. Moreover, the 
possibility of maintaining a pool of economists that advise member countries can also mitigate 
this problem. Finally, a good argument can also be made that Fund conditionality is not the 
appropriate mechanism to deal with truly impoverished countries that require overall 
restructuring of their economies rather than temporary loans. World Bank conditionality or the 
PRGF discussed above are more suitable mechanisms for this purpose. Thus the proposal is more 
relevant to countries that generally have sufficient resources to run their own affairs.  
It may be noted that the more detailed and complex the submissions that countries have to 
make when applying to the Fund, the more difficult it will be for countries to comply with the 
requirements. Again, the interest in both countries’ ownership and responsible policy-making 
should be considered. The objective is to design procedural requirements, which are not too 
burdensome to prevent governments from making submissions to the Fund, but yet require of 
them a reasonable measure of commitment and seriousness in making these submissions.  
 
 
C. The Fund Can Still Impose its Own Views on Developing Countries 
 
It may be argued that the Fund might take an overtly restrictive view of the range of 
reasonableness and strike down too easily conditions proposed by member countries. The 
standard of reasonableness is very flexible, and domestic jurisprudence shows that it may be 
applied with varying degrees of intensity.  
There are several replies to this argument. First, there is no better alternative. A standard of 
reasonableness creates a better balance between sovereignty and responsible lending than the 
current practice, under which the actual level of ownership is somewhat arbitrary and affected by 
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extraneous considerations. The reasonableness standard recognizes the right of countries to 
continue making their policies, but also the fact that strongly owned policies may be misguided, 
in which case the Fund should insist on internal reform while explaining the reasons for its 
position.106  
Second, the risk of unduly restrictive application of the reasonableness standard is mitigated 
by several factors. The country has a right of first proposal in designing the content of Fund 
programs. The Fund will have to refer to the terms proposed by the country, and if it decides not 
to accept the proposal, it must provide the reasons for its decision.107 These reasons will be 
published and presumably scrutinized by reference to this standard. The emergence and growth 
of precedents and standards will add certainty to the application of reasonableness. Accordingly, 
it will be difficult for the Fund – or at least, more difficult than under the present system – to use 
reasonableness in order to supplant the judgment of domestic authorities.108 
Third, the Fund does care about its public image. Recent criticisms of its policies have led the 
Fund to consider various changes concerning its relationship with developing countries.109 If the 
Fund is to have a legal obligation to explain its decisions publicly, this may well be a sufficient 
incentive for the Fund to exercise its judgment fairly and consistently. The costs of being 
regarded as ‘unjust’ toward developing countries are high and borne not only by the Fund but 
                                                 
106 IEO (2004), above footnote 27, at 6: ‘Emphasis on country ownership in IMF-supported programs can lead to an 
undesirable outcome, if ownership means misguided or excessively weak policies. The IMF should be prepared not 
to support strongly owned policies if it judges they are inadequate to generate a desired outcome, while providing 
the rationale and evidence behind such decisions.’ [my emphasis]  
107 Recent literature on negotiations suggests that the right to make the first proposal gives a substantial advantage in 
negotiations to the party making the first proposal and affects the outcome in favor of that party, especially in 
situations of ambiguity and uncertainty. The reason for this is that a first offer has a strong anchoring effect on the 
other party, which influences the ensuing negotiation between the parties. See Adam D. Galinsky, ‘Should You 
Make the First Offer?’, Negotiation (July 2004). The anchoring here would probably be of lesser effect than in 
straightforward negotiations because of the Fund’s review powers, and because the Fund possesses significant 
knowledge of members’ economic affairs.  
108 It is also noteworthy that the experience of the OMB in reviewing regulation suggests that the reviewing body 
can operate effectively by complementing the regulatory process rather than supplanting the discretion of the 
regulator.  
109 For example, the inclusion of the concept of ownership in the Guidelines on Conditionality and the establishment 
of the PRGF. See Woods, above footnote 56.  
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also by its major shareholders. Without good reasons, it will be very difficult for the Fund to 
disapprove reasonable submissions.   
Alternatively, as suggested above, it is possible to consider having a review mechanism of 
the Fund’s decision by an advisory committee. This may be necessary if public censure is not a 
sufficient incentive for the Fund to exercise its power fairly and consistently. But again, the 
major downside is that the procedure may become too legalized and cumbersome.  
 
D. The IMF Has to Work Fast – the Costs of a Prolonged Procedure 
 
In many instances, the Fund has to make decisions in no more than several weeks, or even days. 
For example, in the case of the economic crisis in Argentina that erupted in 2001, the country 
was in need of immediate funds. Countries may have no time to make detailed submissions to 
the Fund.  
There are several replies to this argument. First, in most circumstances member countries do 
have sufficient time to make submissions to the Fund. The average time in which countries 
negotiate with the Fund over the terms of loans is approximately one month, and in many 
instances negotiations may take even longer. By contrast to the previous example, in other 
instances Argentina negotiated loans with the Fund over a period of several months without any 
major new crisis emerging during that time.110  
Second, the procedure can be carried out relatively promptly. Well-crafted policies can be 
prepared quickly, especially if the application procedure is regularized, studied and practiced for 
some time.111 It is also likely that countries that are frequently in need of Fund assistance will 
assign specific officers with the responsibility of making applications to the Fund when 
necessary; presumably, these will be officers that already work vis-à-vis the Fund regarding 
                                                 
110 Similarly, in the case of Russia in 1992-1993 negotiations took many months, indeed over a year. See Lowenfeld, 
above footnote 47, at 597-603.  
111 The formalization of the procedure and the emergence of case-studies and standards may also expedite the 
process. The IEO has said in connection with the crisis in Argentina in 2001: ‘A more rule-based decision-making 
process could likely result in a faster resolution of a crisis when a solution is uncertain.’ (See IEO (2004), above 
footnote 27, at 73 [my emphasis]).  
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other issues, such as surveillance.112 The review procedure, with the help of guidelines, 
precedents and organized coordination with member countries, can be conducted relatively 
quickly. Although it does not normally operate in emergency circumstances, the experience of 
the OMB shows that review of complex regulation can be conducted in a relatively short time.113 
Third, certain solutions may be designed to deal with emergency cases. For example, if the 
procedure and formalities for applying to the Fund are not specified in advance, the Fund may 
relax them in emergency cases. As suggested above, the Fund may then take the sufficiency of 
the procedure followed (i.e., the reasons, facts and consultations on which the submission is 
based) into account when considering the reasonableness of the proposed conditions. On this 
view, a short, laconic submission may be reasonable in circumstances of extreme emergency. 
Alternatively, the procedure can provide for the applicant to ask for immediate financial 
assistance in return for a commitment to come up with a proposal for reform by some deadline. If 
necessary, the Fund could state its own conditionality immediately, as it does now, but with the 
understanding that this would be the default should the applicant’s proposal be adjudged 
unreasonable.114 The applicant would still have the option of accepting the Fund’s default 
conditions.115 Finally, countries may still waive their right of first proposal if they prefer the 
Fund to step in immediately.116 
Fourth, a bad policy imposed quickly is worse than a good policy delayed for some time. 
This clearly holds true in cases where the conditions imposed by the Fund have aggravated the 
economic situation of the borrower country. It is also valid in cases where the member country is 
                                                 
112 During the Clinton administration each agency appointed a Regulatory Policy Officer to work with the OMB. 
Similarly, countries may assign the responsibility of dealing with the Fund to specific officers.  
113 OMB review normally takes 60 days or less. The Fund’s review is likely to take less time given the emergency 
environment in which the Fund operates and given that, unlike in OMB review, member countries would not have to 
submit a detailed cost-benefit analysis.  
114 The problem here would be that the Fund may require some irreversible conditions to be immediately 
implemented. However, this is not usually the case, and normally it takes some time until the required reform is 
expected to be implemented.  
115 In such circumstances, the Fund’s conditions may remain confidential until the applicant country makes its own 
proposal or accepts the Fund’s conditions.   
116 It should be noted that exercising a waiver may incur some costs to the countries nonetheless, because it may 
indicate to the market that the government is unable to formulate its own policies.  
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reluctant to implement conditions imposed by the Fund. In such cases, effective implementation 
is unlikely, the chances for economic recovery are low and the potential for strife between the 
country and Fund officials is high. Therefore, the costs of some delay, if any, are likely to be less 
than the benefits of creating a system that produces more effective policy-making in developing 
countries.  
Some undue delay, however, may occur when countries make proposals that are clearly 
inadequate. Moreover, governments may manipulate the process and make sham proposals to the 
Fund. This may occur either because the government wants to be perceived as resisting 
intervention by the Fund,117 or because it is simply acting recklessly. To provide for such 
situations, it may be useful for the Fund to have some limited power to deny a country the right 
to design self-imposed conditions. Such power, if adopted, should be used sparingly in extreme 
situations where reform must be carried out to bring about financial stability, and where the 
government is clearly incapable of initiating it.118 
 
E. The Administrative Costs are too High 
 
It may be argued that the administrative costs involved in this new procedure, especially the 
costs of making submissions and explaining decisions may be excessive.  
As regards the costs to the Fund, it is submitted that they will not necessarily be higher than 
under the present system. The Fund will have to bear the additional costs of publishing its 
decisions and the reasons for them. But if member countries will do most of the work of 
designing and formulating loan conditions, the Fund can save the costs of preparing and fiercely 
negotiating arrangements.119 Even in cases where the Fund disapproves a proposal, its costs in 
                                                 
117 In some cases, the government may prefer outright external intervention to bring about internal reform, for 
example, because various interest groups within the country resist such reform. 
118 Presumably, the Fund will have to justify and give reasons when exercising such extreme powers.  
119 Note, however, that the costs of maintaining a pool of economists may be subsidized by the Fund.  
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preparing the conditions may be reduced to the extent that it has already examined the economic 
situation of the relevant country and acquired relevant information.  
As regards the applying country, it may be more costly to prepare an economic policy rather 
than have the Fund prepare it. Nonetheless, the benefits of being able to design the policy 
independently, whether they derive from non-interference with the country’s sovereignty or from 
more effective policies, are likely to outweigh these administrative costs. Moreover, as noted 
above, it is plausible that countries will take the opportunity to establish mechanisms to deal with 
the Fund rapidly and efficiently, for example, by training officers to prepare the required 
submissions and specialize in matters of concern to the Fund. In any case, countries can always 
choose to waive their right to make submissions to the Fund; but if they choose to make the 
submissions, this would be the best indication that the benefits of designing conditions outweigh 
the costs of doing so.  
 
F. Other Countries and Private Banks Will Not Assist the Fund in making Loans 
 
Additional co-operation and the provision of further funds by other countries and private banks 
have in many cases been essential to complement the Fund’s assistance. One notable example is 
the United States’ $20 billion aid package to Mexico in 1995.120 It could be argued that countries 
and private banks may not be willing to cooperate with the Fund if country borrowers are given a 
right to impose conditions on themselves. However, if the quality of conditions increases and 
countries have a better chance of recovery, there is no reason why other parties should be 
reluctant to continue to play the same role and lend similar assistance, as they do under the 
current system. In fact, there are strong indications that private actors increasingly act 
                                                 
120 See Lowenfeld, above footnote 47, at 586-590. 
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independently of the Fund and tend to make their own judgments as to the merits and probability 
of success of countries’ policies, even in the face of disapproval by the Fund.121   
 
G. Confidentiality Versus Transparency   
 
Enhanced transparency is a key element of the proposal set out in this paper. Some may argue 
that confidentiality and informality are essential to the Fund’s operations. This argument may 
largely be divided into four claims. I will take each of these claims in turn.  
Confidentiality and informality are sometimes seen as essential to enable governments to 
agree to accept conditions they would otherwise be incapable to adopt because of internal 
opposition. Several counter-arguments can be made. First, the fact that confidentiality has 
facilitated formal acceptance of certain conditions by governments does not necessarily mean 
that these conditions were desirable or complied with. As shown above, conditionality has often 
been ineffective, and without sufficient ownership, including sufficient political and social 
support, compliance with conditions is unlikely. Second, under the current system not only 
hasn’t agreement been secured between the Fund and developing countries, but strife has 
actually reached new heights. In addition, in some instances, confidentiality enabled the Fund to 
put pressure on governments to accept policies that they were not willing to accept.122 Third, 
under this proposal, a decision to seek Fund assistance is likely to attract less internal political 
opposition because the Fund’s power over governments is limited. The government continues to 
                                                 
121 Jamaica’s experience, as depicted in IEO (2002), above footnote 28, strongly supports this point. In 1996 Jamaica 
decided not to seek further Fund assistance because of disagreements with the Fund over its economic policies. 
Nonetheless, Jamaica was able to maintain access to private markets on relatively good terms. It is also remarkable 
that Jamaican officials published IMF surveillance reports even when they did not fully share the Fund’s views and 
explained the reasons for their different approach.   
122 Under self-imposed conditionality, a potential strife between the Fund and a member country may occur if both 
sides cling to their views and the Fund formally disapproves a country’s submission. Such a scenario is only 
expected to occur when both sides are truly persuaded of their position, and when the costs of entering into a direct 
dispute are lower than the costs of accepting the other side’s position. Because a greater public debate will no doubt 
follow, a major cost of entering into dispute is the cost of losing in such a debate. These costs will be particularly 
high because each party’s position is published and scrutinized. Accordingly, each party will normally challenge the 
other publicly only if it has good reasons for its position. It is submitted that in such cases, where there is a genuine 
disagreement between the Fund and a country, greater public debate will help achieve better results and more 
effective ex post study.   
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make its own policies subject to specified grounds of review, and the Fund’s intervention has to 
be thoroughly explained.123 Fourth, economic recovery has been more effective where countries 
pursued economic reform openly and publicly. For example, the recovery of the Korean 
economy in the late 1990s was partly due to the openness of the government commitment to 
economic reform and cooperation with the Fund.   
A second possible claim is that publication of certain facts about the applying country may in 
some circumstances injure the economic outlook for that country. Although this may be true, 
especially in the short run, concealing information may be even more costly. The IEO, for 
example, recommends that the Fund should be able to disclose information, including 
unfavorable information, about misguided domestic policies and express its views regarding the 
need for critical reforms:‘…relevant information should be disclosed even if it may cause 
negative shifts in market sentiment because, in the long run, the IMF cannot expect to be 
effective if it is perceived as willing to go along with hiding information from the markets.’124 
The Fund’s endorsement of domestic policies does not by itself restore confidence without 
sufficient justification of the rationale of the program and disclosure of all relevant 
information.125 As discussed above, transparency and communication of the rationale of program 
design are highly important for building the credibility of Fund programs.  
The third and fourth claims also concern the publicity of the procedure. If the Fund publishes 
its disapproval of a state’s proposal, various counter reactions may become disruptive to the 
continuance of the lending process and various groups may seek to challenge or influence the 
                                                 
123 An internal debate on the content of submissions will no doubt take place, but such a debate can be conducive to 
achieving broader domestic support for policies and strengthening ownership.  
124 IEO (2003a), above footnote 28, at 44 [my emphasis]; at 53, the IEO expressly recommends early publication of 
‘any unfavorable information’. Also see IEO (2004), above footnote 27, at 71:‘An important lesson of the Argentine 
experience is that strong ownership should not deter the IMF from forcefully making its views known. The IMF 
should be prepared not to support a strongly owned program, if it is judged inadequate in generating a desired 
outcome, but should be prepared to explain the rationale and evidence behind such decisions.’ [My emphasis]  
125 See discussion above, especially footnote 121. Also see IEO (2004), above footnote 27. The latter report says that 
market actors were puzzled by the Fund’s actions in the Argentinean crises and that the Fund’s endorsement of bad 
domestic policies did not help restore the confidence of commercial banks, which were well aware that problems 
continued to persist.   
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Fund’s operation. In addition, publicity can discourage countries from revealing information to 
the Fund and making submissions.126 These concerns over publicity can be resolved by 
modifying the publication requirement. Publication of submissions or of the Fund’s reasons for 
its decisions need not occur in the midst of the process of application and negotiations. There are 
two main options. First, the Fund may publish the reasons for its decision, including all relevant 
documents, after a certain period of time following the conclusion of the loan agreement. 
Accordingly, the information will no longer have any effect on the lending process or on the 
economy of the country. Second, it may be possible to leave the publication to the discretion of 
the country. The Fund will deliver its reasons to the member country, and the country will 
consider whether it wishes to publish the information.  
The second option has the advantage of being able to protect a country from disclosure of 
information that may be sensitive to its economy. But this is not a compelling advantage. Under 
the first option, the country hardly needs protection because the information published will have 
already become stale. More fundamentally, the first option is preferable because of the benefits 
of ex post review and mutual study. It ensures that countries can learn from the experience of 
other countries. Programs, policies and the Fund’s review can be deliberated, criticized and 
improved – for the benefit of all countries.  
It should be emphasized, however, that these two options have one significant drawback. 
Under both options there would be less scope for timely criticism of the Fund’s decisions and 
discussion of alternative choices. The country which is directly affected by the Fund’s decision 
may not be able to influence the Fund to agree to its position through public and academic 
pressure. Again, there is no need to make a conclusive determination for the present purposes as 
regards which option is preferable. The point is that there should be a balance between the 
                                                 
126 Although note that, as discussed above, countries will also have an incentive to disclose information to the extent 
that this will allow them to get financial assistance on the basis of owned policies. In addition, it should be added 
that published reasons should be limited to those necessary to explain a decision and must not extend to general and 
irrelevant information on a country’s economic situation.  
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benefits of timely criticism as against the potentially (and arguably) harmful effect of publicity 
on the lending procedure and the economy of the applying country.  
 
 
V. Legalization, Formalization and the Role of the IMF 
 
Legalization has been broadly defined by reference to three dimensions: obligation, precision 
and delegation.127 At present the degree of legalization of the Fund’s activities is regarded as 
relatively low,128 although this may be less accurate when considering conditionality apart from 
other Fund activities.129 In any case, if the proposal for self-imposed conditionality is adopted, 
the procedure for applying to the Fund and its operation will be substantially legalized and 
formalized. Instead of having a relatively informal procedure whereby the Fund negotiates 
arrangements with member countries, the Fund and member countries will have to follow a 
regularized procedure and act within specifically defined powers.  
As pointed out by Kahler, it is impossible to specify in generalized terms the consequences of 
legalization and formalization.130 Although legalization may lead to improved compliance of 
member countries and increased credibility and legitimacy of international institutions, it may 
also create various costs, such as administrative costs, sovereignty costs, etc. The consequences 
of legalization depend on its substance and on the institution in question.  
I argue above that in the context of the Fund’s operation legalization will provide various 
benefits to the Fund and its client member countries. Legalization will grant legitimacy to the 
Fund’s power to intervene in countries’ internal affairs, increase transparency and accountability 
                                                 
127 Kenneth O. W. Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter & Duncan Snidal, ‘The 
Concept of Legalization’, International Organization, Vol. 54, Issue 3 (June 2000), 401. Obligation means that states 
or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or a set of rules or commitments. Precision means that rules 
unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize and prescribe. Delegation means that third parties have 
been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules.  
128 Ibid.. The Fund has a low level of obligation and precision, but a high to moderate level of delegation.  
129 The Fund has various tasks including surveillance and consultation. Conditionality probably has a higher degree 
of obligation and precision than the Fund’s other activities. Once included in loan agreements, conditions are fairly 
precise and binding on member countries.  
130 Miles Kahler, ‘Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization’, International Organization, Vol. 54, 
Issue 3 (June 2000), 661. 
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of the Fund’s decision-making process, and enhance the participation of developing countries. In 
addition, legalization is likely to improve compliance with conditions, not only because of 
increased ownership, but also because it strengthens countries’ commitment to abide by their 
obligations pursuant to these conditions.131 Within the developing countries, legalization can also 
lead to specialization because governments will have incentives to train people to engage with 
the Fund.   
Legalization may also lead to a change in the Fund’s function. Instead of trying to tell 
countries in financial distress what to do, it will assume a role as educator of developing 
countries. The manner in which the Fund will apply its review powers over conditions proposed 
by member countries will signal to member countries the Fund’s understandings of the limits of 
reasonable economic policy-making.  
The Fund can further assume the role of educator by continuing to make its information 
resources available to all member countries, especially those applying to it. The Fund will retain 
a record of all case-studies and precedents that the new procedure will generate. These cases may 
in fact lead to a convergence of economic ideas and economic thought. Likewise, they can 
increase our understanding of the effectiveness of alternative policies in similar situations. The 
Fund thus will keep information on potential economic solutions and regulatory structures.132 
Member countries, especially developing countries, will be able to use these resources to study 
the experiences of other countries and choose the economic and regulatory frameworks that fit 
their political and social needs.  
                                                 
131 Beth A. Simmons, ‘The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs’, International Organization, Vol. 54, 
Issue 3 (June 2000), 573. Simmons argues that legalization of international monetary affairs has improved 
compliance with the Fund’s monetary rules under Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement because it increases 
countries’ commitment to these rules and the reputational costs of reneging on them. On this view, with further 
legalization of conditionality, countries’ commitment to implement conditions could be strengthened.  
132 As Pistor, above footnote 84 at 128, says in relation to international standard-setting, there ought to be ‘ …a 
market for information on the scope of legal solutions to solve comparable problems, including information about 
how these solutions are tied into the general legal framework and the enforcement institutions’. Pistor’s argument is 
equally applicable to the Fund’s role as educator of domestic economies.  
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Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that the costs of legalization and formalization will 
not be substantial. The main costs of legalization, as pointed out by Kahler, are sovereignty costs 
and the costs of inflexibility of policy-making.133 As to the former, my proposal accords more 
respect to the sovereignty of member countries than the current system. As to the latter, the 
proposal is inherently flexible because it does not prescribe predetermined solutions or 
obligations. In fact, it is more flexible than the current system because it is designed to give 
effect to a wider range of ideas and policies. Finally, the potential costs of delay and 
administrative costs have been discussed above. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The proposal for self-imposed conditionality has many benefits. It is likely to lead to increased 
participation, transparency and accountability, better compliance with loan conditions, more 
respect for sovereignty, and less strife between the Fund and developing countries. The Fund can 
assume a role as educator of developing countries, which in turn will have greater incentive to 
improve their economic policy-making. The procedure for self-imposition of conditions and the 
Fund’s review of proposed conditions are likely to induce mutual study of the international 
financial system through a deliberative process. Most importantly, the procedure is likely to 
generate better economic programs for economic recovery, recognizing that in some instances 
domestic officials know best, whereas in other instances intervention by external professionals is 
required.  
The main difficulty with the proposal may be its implementation. Developed countries and 
the Fund may be reluctant to cede control over the lending mechanism. This is unjustified, 
because the proposal contemplates that the Fund will retain the power to strike down 
unreasonable conditions. Developing countries may resist legalization because of the 
transparency element and because it makes non-compliance with conditions more difficult. In 
                                                 
133 Kahler, above footnote 130, at 664-665. 
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addition, as I discuss above, concerns over issues, such as, the costs of resources, delay in 
program design and the publicity of the procedure need to be addressed. Perhaps the move 
towards self-imposition of conditions should be accomplished gradually and with some 
experimentation before changing the current system.  
I also note that there are several issues that merit consideration but are not discussed in this 
paper. One example is the question of which instrument is best suited to accommodate the 
proposed procedure: an amendment to the Articles of Agreement, a Board resolution, or internal 
guidelines. Another important issue concerns the question of who within the Fund will be 
responsible for making decisions on the reasonableness of country’s submissions and for 
providing the reasons for such decisions: the Fund’s management, the Executive Board, or 
both.134 Consultations with civil society should also be duly incorporated into the procedure, 
although not necessarily via formal arrangements.  
Finally, it is also worth noting that this proposal is not incompatible with other reform 
proposals that concern financial crises of developing countries, the international bankruptcy 
procedure in particular. International bankruptcy assumes that the Fund will continue to lend to 
member countries.135 Accordingly, reform of the lending procedure and conditionality is 
necessary irrespective of other reform initiatives. 
 
                                                 
134 A plausible solution would be for the Fund’s management to provide a full account of its view of the 
reasonableness of submissions. If the Board decides to depart from the views of the staff, it will have to provide its 
own explanation. Both the staff’s account and the Board’s decision will be published.  
135 See Hal S. Scott, ‘A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?’, Int’l Law, Vol. 37 (2003), 103; Anne 
Krueger, Address at Institute for International Economics Conference on Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and 
Hazards, New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on our Thinking (April, 2002), at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm (last visited 10 September  2004). 
